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Sunday, 16 June 2019

230) I BELIEVE WITH PERFECT FAITH - IN WHICH TEXT?

Rambam writing in Arabic with Hebrew characters.

INTRODUCTION:

Many are familiar with the beautiful and ‘haunting’[1] traditional melody of Ani Ma’amin that reminds us to believe in, and await, the Messiah every day that passes. This stirring tune is attributed to Azriel David Fastag, a Modzitzer Chassid, who is said to have composed it while in a cattle car on the way to Treblinka. He told his travelling companions that he would give half his share in the world to come to anyone who would convey his melody to the Modzitzer Rebbe who had already escaped Europe in 1940. 

Two men volunteered and jumped from the moving train. One was killed from the fall and the other survived and brought the melody to Israel where he gave it over to the Rebbe’s son, who in turn passed it on to his father[2]. The melody was also adopted by many Jews who went to the gas chambers singing Ani Ma’amin.

In this article, we shall examine the origin, development and wording of the Thirteen Principles of Faith as we know them through the thirteen stanzas of Ani Ma’amin.

ORIGINS IN PEREK CHELEK:

The Thirteen Principles of Faith originated in the writings of Rambam, in his Introduction to his Commentary on the Mishna (Sanhedrin, Chapter 10[3]) known as Perek Chelek.[4] This was written around 1168, when Rambam was thirty years old.

[Rambam was not the only rabbi to formulate Principles of Faith. Albo, for example, formulated three basic Principals of Faith. See The Albo - Pushing the limits of Inclusive Theology.]

Rambam’s Perek Chelek was originally written in Judeo-Arabic, or Arabic in Hebrew characters, and towards the end of a fascinating discussion in his Introduction, he enumerated Thirteen Principles which Jews are required to believe in.[5]

To date, there are about six different Hebrew translations[6] of the original Arabic text. This, naturally, creates problems in terms of wording, definitions and translations of key concepts which are crucial to defining exactly what we are supposed to believe in.

“I BELIEVE WITH PERFECT FAITH”:

Surprisingly, the opening formula “I believe with perfect faith” is noticeably absent from the original Arabic text. 

According to Encyclopaedia Judaica it is “reminiscent of early Christian creeds” and “has no basis in the Arabic original”.

It was only in a Hebrew translation of the Arabic (by Shlomo ben Yosef ibn Yakov) that expressions like le ha’amin (to believe) were first interpolated or inserted into the text.

ANI MA’AMIN:

Up to this point, we have only been discussing the translations of the original Arabic Perek Chelek, which was part of Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishna. The compilation of Ani Ma’amin, however, was a later development and basically a summary of what was found in Perek Chelek. Ani Ma’amin is today printed in almost every prayer book and is often recited daily after the morning service.

Although the general consensus is that we do not know who wrote the formulations of the Ani Ma’amin - according to the Torah Temimah, R. Baruch Epstein (d. 1942)[7], they were written by Rambam himself. This is most unlikely as the first time Ani Ma’amin began to surface was around the 1500s which was three centuries after Rambam.

YIGDAL:

Another piyut or poem, similarly composed and worked around the Thirteen Principles as they were found in Perek Chelek, was Yigdal. This well-known hymn is also of unknown authorship, although Shadal[8] suggests it may have been composed by R. Daniel ben Yehudah around the 1300s. 

Once again there is the suggestion - this time by R. Yakov Emden in his siddur - that it was composed by Rambam himself, and again this is highly unlikely as the first time Yigdal appeared in a siddur was in 1486.

DIFFERENT VERSIONS OF ANI MA’AMIN IN SEFARDI AND ASHKENAZI NUSCHAOT:

Some fundamentally important and rather nuanced implications become apparent when we look at how Ani Ma’amin is recorded in the different Sefardi and Ashkenazi rites:

TORAH MIN HASHAMAYIM:

Here is an example of a difference between Sefardi and Ashkenazi versions of Ani Ma’amin:
Principal no. 8 in the Ashkenazi rite, reads:





 “I believe with perfect faith that the entire Torah, that we now have in our hands, is that which was given to Moses.”

However, in the terse Sefardi version it simply states (as Principal no. 9[9]):

  


“I believe...that the Torah was given from Heaven.”

No mention is made in the Sefardi version that one has to believe that “the entire Torah, that we now have in our hands, is that which was given to Moses.” 

Thus the concept of Torah min haShamayim - the belief that Torah was given from Heaven - is left somewhat less defined than in the Ashkenazi version.

AWAITING THE MESSIAH ‘EACH DAY THAT PASSES’:

In the popular Ashkenazi version of Ani Ma’amim (and in all the songs) the text of the Principal no. 12 reads: 




“I believe with perfect faith in the coming of Mashiach, and although he may tarry, nevertheless, I wait every day for him to come.”

However, in the Sefardi version, it simply states:




 “I believe...that the King Messiah will come.”

No mention is made of awaiting the Messiah on a daily basis.

Furthermore in Rambam’s original writing in Perek Chelek, there is also absolutely no mention of awaiting “every day for him to come”.

Rambam’s original text simply reads:

“If he delays, wait for him (Hab 2:3).”[10]

Rambam references Habbakuk 2:3 which, referring to the Redemption, reads, “[T]hough it tarry, wait for it,” but there is no mention of anything close to waiting constantly “each day that passes.”

As an interesting exercise, I looked up every English translation of the Bible from the (Brenton) Septuagint to King James, and even to the Good News version including cross-references to other parts of Jewish and non-Jewish Scriptures (in a ‘Treasury of Scripture’) and could not find a single reference to waiting for the Messiah “each day that passes.”

Also, in the Yigdal paraphrase, it states, “At the end of days, He will send his Messiah...” This too seems to negate the idea of waiting “each day” for an anticipated event destined to only take place “at the end of days.”

Somehow the anonymous author of Ani Ma’amin slipped that phrase in - and ever since then it appears to have become part of the popular narrative with no basis from its source text in Perek Chelek nor its mother text in Habbakuk.

To illustrate how a culture has built up around this notion of waiting for the Messiah “each day that passes” consider the following extract from popular contemporary media:

“When you are davening for a sick person, do you ask that Hashem should heal them whenever He decides, or, do you ask that Hashem should heal them now?
The same way we ask for a Refua Sheleima that it should take place now, we should ask for Moshiach today.
Ani Ma’amin is not just saying that we hope Moshiach comes, but is a demand for Moshiach to finally come today!”[11]

COUNTER ARGUMENTS TO THE THIRTEEN PRINCIPALS:

In a fascinating article by Professor Marc Shapiro[12], published in Torah U-Madda Journal, we see how Torah scholars themselves not always agreed with the ‘definitive’ Thirteen Principals of Rambam.

[Note: The intent here is neither to challenge nor champion the Thirteen Principals, but simply to show the divergence of Torah thought even on such fundamental matters.]

Here are just some examples of stark rabbinic dissent against the Thirteen Principals:    
      
Principal no. 3 proclaims that G-d has no body: - As we have seen in previous posts, the notion that G-d has some form of corporeality (body) was not uncommon amongst some Tannaim and Baalei haTosafot.

Principal no. 7 proclaims that Moshe was the greatest prophet: - Yet R. Shneur Zalman of Liadi wrote (1745-1813) in Likutei Amarim that the prophetic experience of the Ari Zal was superior to that of Moshe.

Principal no. 8 proclaims that “The entire Torah, that we now have in our hands,  is that which was given to Moses” [Ashkenazi version]: - Some Talmudic texts quote sections from the Torah (and Nach) that are slightly different from the Torah scrolls we use today. [See The Aleppo Codex.]

R. Shlomo ben Aderet, known as Rashba (1235-1310), dealt with the issue of whether or not we should change our Torah texts to match the versions as presented in the Talmudic texts.

R. Moshe Sofer, known as the Chatam Sofer (1762-1839), maintained that there was no need to say a blessing on writing a Sefer Torah today because it is possible that the versions recorded in the Talmud may indeed be more correct.

Principal no. 9 proclaims that the Torah will never be abrogated (changed): - According to R. Yosef Albo (1380-1444) it is theoretically possible for a prophet whose credentials are verified in the same way as Moshe’s were, to change the Torah - except for the Ten Commandments which can never be abolished.

Principal no. 12 proclaims the awaiting of Messiah: - According to one opinion recorded in the Talmud itself, R. Hillel (not to be confused with the earlier Hillel) maintains:

“There is no Messiah coming for the Jewish People, as they already ate from him (as all the prophesies relating to the Messiah were already fulfilled) during the days of Hezekiah.”  


And commentary tells us that according to R. Hillel, there will be no Messiah but G-d Himself will redeem the Jewish people instead.

ANALYSIS:

There are three ways we can view the Thirteen Principals:

1) Notwithstanding all the above, it must be said that the consensus among the Jewish People has always been to accept the Thirteen Principals of Rambam as authoritatively binding. This is a fact. 

The argument goes that the same way as we have divergent views on matters of Halacha, yet only rule according to the ‘universally accepted’ view – so too we follow the Thirteen Principals because despite some dissension, they were generally accepted.

2) It must also be pointed out that some do suggest that Rambam made a distinction between certain of his Principals which were deemed crucial or primary, as opposed to others which were famously granted as ‘concessions to the masses’. Rambam himself writes that there are two categories of ‘truths’ - ‘true truths’ and ‘necessary truths’. 

A ‘true truth’ allows one to understand something factually and intellectually while a ‘necessary truth’ is a mistaken belief which allows one to fulfil a social purpose, be obedient to the Torah and alleviate one’s fears. The latter were often found to be effective for what Rambam referred to rather ingloriously as the ‘ignorant masses.’ (See Guide for the Perplexed 3:28.) 

Also, Rambam openly stated in the beginning of his Guide that we must not always take his writings at face value, and that he often hides many of his personal views.

3) There is a third option, somewhat forthrightly articulated by R. Dr Israel Drazin who writes:

 “[M]any Jews, including rabbis, do not realize that Judaism allows a wide spectrum of beliefs.” 

This “ignorance”, he says: “is caused by their narrow focus on the Talmuds, codes of Jewish Law and responsa literature, while ignoring the theological literature...

Orthodox Jews can hold nonconforming and dissenting views - even on fundamental issues – without being considered rebels against Judaism.”[13]

Either way, whichever approach we choose to adopt, our point of departure should include consultation with the original Arabic writings of Rambam - not the many Hebrew translations and certainly not the Ani Ma’amim nor the Yigdal - in order to establish the exact legal and theological tenor of Rambam’s Thirteen Principals as he intended them to be understood.




[1] As described in Jewish Virtual Library, Ani Ma’amin.
[2] Or, in another version, the survivor sang it to the Modzitzer Rebbe in America (Faith Without Ani Ma’amin, R. Tamir Granot).
[3] In some editions it is Chapter 11.
[4] It is called Perek Chelek after the opening words of the Mishna which reads ‘Kol Yisrael yeish lahem chelek laOlam haBah.’
[5] There is some discussion as to whether Rambam intended all Thirteen Principles to be of equal importance.
[6] R. Shlomo ben Yosef ibn Yakov of Saragossa; R. Shmuel Ibn Tibbon (1150-1230); R. Yehudah alHarizi (1165-1225); Abarvanel in his Rosh Amanah (1437-1508); R. Yosef Kapach (1917-2000); and R. Yitzchak Shilat.
[7] See his commentary on the siddur.
[8] R. Shmuel David Luzzatto !1800-1865).
[9] The order of Principals is not identical.
[10] Maimonides Introduction to Perek Helek (Maimonides Heritage Center). The Twelfth Fundamental Principal. P. 22.
[11] Maor - Daily Rebbe Video. June 12 2017
[12] Maimonides’ Thirteen Principals: The Last Word in Jewish Theology? by Marc Shapiro.
[13] The Rejection of Maimonides’ “Jewish Beliefs” by Recognized Jewish Scholars and Rabbis, by Israel Drazin.

Monday, 10 June 2019

229) READING TALMUDIC TEXTS THROUGH MODERN ‘FILTERS’:



INTRODUCTION:

In this article, we examine how the later scholars often view the theological teachings of the early Talmudic rabbis through various lenses. These lenses are either their own, or as is often the case, they are the filters created by a previous generation of scholars. In both instances though, the original Talmudic teachings, particularly those dealing with less tangible, non-Halachic and theological matters, run the risk of being distorted.

This distortion, however, would not necessarily apply to the Talmudic pronouncements and discussions on practical Halacha as by their very nature, they are more concrete, clear and less prone to misrepresentation.

I draw from a technical but fascinating scholarly paper[1] by Yeshiva University graduate, Professor Dov Weiss, who writes:

[Some modern][2] scholars of Judaism...typically read statements about God in the classical sources of Judaism - Mishna, Midrash and the Talmuds - with a mediaeval philosophical lens. By doing so, they sought to demonstrate the essential unity and continuity between rabbinic Judaism, later mediaeval Jewish philosophy and modern Judaism.”

In other words, the more modern scholars were happy to read Talmudic statements about theology through the ‘more sophisticated’ philosophical lenses of mediaeval rationalists like Rambam. This made such teachings seem more acceptable to the modern mind.

THE VARIOUS FILTERS:

Weiss points out a common mistake that many of us make when we read the classical Talmudic texts: Depending on which side of the fence we sit - we read the Talmud through the filters either of the philosophical/rational views of Rambam, or the mystical views of the mediaeval Kabbalists (both of which emerged during the mediaeval period around the 1200’s).

And when we do this, our understanding of the original classical Talmudic texts (particularly on theological matters) is often distorted.

CONFRONTING THE TALMUDIC THEOLOGICAL TEXTS ‘ON THEIR OWN TERMS’:   

Weiss proposes, therefore, that:

 “[W]e should confront the theological rabbinic texts on their own terms, without the guiding hand of either [rational or mystical][3] mediaeval Jewish framework.”

In other words, we need to look at Talmudic perceptions of divinity as if there were no rational Rambam nor mystical Kabbalah vying for our attention and colouring our interpretation of early rabbinic (Talmudic) theology.

PERCEPTIONS OF G-D IN THE ‘RAW’ TALMUD:

Let us now turn to some ‘raw’ Talmudic statements on the nature of G-d, without the hindsight of  1,500 years of interpretation and explanation:

Weiss cites R. Dr Alon Goshen-Gottstein who notices that:

“[I]n all of rabbinic [i.e. Talmudic][4] literature there is not a single statement that categorically denies that God has body or form.”

Of course, this does not mean that the Talmudic Sages all believed that G-d has some ‘form’, but the fact that a corporeal G-d was not specifically outlawed somewhere within the vast expanses of Talmudic literature, is significant.

The notion that G-d may have been understood by some Talmudic sages as possessing some ‘form’ or corporeality is astounding but not unusual. [See The Notion that G-d has a ‘Body’, and The Tosafists[5].]

Weiss puts it a little more directly:

“[W]e seem to have full acceptance - at least on a straightforward reading – that the rabbinic God, much like the biblical G-d, should be viewed as embodying a human-like personality.”

Ironically, “as further evidence”, Weiss cites Professor Guy Gedalyah Stroumsa, who shows how early Christian thinkers from the same time as the Talmudic period, like Origen (184-253), Justin Martyr (100-165) and Basil the Great (330-379) “criticised the Jewish belief in the corporeality of God.”[6]

Were these sources mistaken or were they able to base themselves on something more substantial?

RABBINIC ANTHROPOMORPHISMS EXCEED THOSE OF THE TORAH:

Weiss continues:

“Posing a problem for later Jewish philosophers, some [Talmudic][7] rabbis anthropomorphize God in ways that outdo anything we encounter in the Hebrew Bible...

 Although in Scripture, God is conceived as having humanlike limbs and organs such as arms, eyes, and legs, and humanlike emotions such as love, anger, regret, and jealousy, rabbinic literature expands the anthropomorphic...field by having God assume humanlike roles and features never entertained by biblical authors.”

What follows are some examples of this rabbinic “intensification” of the corporeality of G-d: - Remember, we are reading the ‘raw’ Talmudic and Midrashic texts without the aid of any later Kabbalistic or rationalist filters, explanations or interpretations:

The 3rd-century Amora, Rav, described  G-d as using His finger (to burn angels who opposed man's creation) and His hand (to diminish the size of Adam after he sinned).  [San. 38a]

R. Akiva (50-135) and others suggest that G-d went into ‘exile’, implying a type of physical bondage with the Jewish people after the Temple was destroyed.

R. Akiva and R. Yishmael debate [Mechilta de'R. Yishmael on Shemot 12:2] how the calculation for the new month was explained to the people.  R. Yishmael says Moshe showed them the new moon, while R. Akiva says the "G-d pointed out with his finger", as He did in three other instances when Moshe found something difficult to understand.

Regarding this particular Mechilta, Professor Meir Bar Ilan points out that in some copies the manuscripts were altered and "corrected" by "scribes who preferred not to relate anthropomorphic ideas to God."
In some instances, the phrase "G-d's finger" was purified to read "a finger" and in other instances, it was omitted entirely.  
Then, in Midrash haGadol, R. Yishmael says that on various occasions, G-d used different fingers to achieve different ends. [ See link to his paper at the end of this article.]

The ‘vertical hierarchy’ of G-d’s relationship with man is downplayed, whereas the ‘horizontal relationship’ is emphasized. Thus G-d is depicted as a ‘friend’ or ‘brother’ – and “the rabbinic God at times assumes a weaker position in the human-divine metaphor.” I would assume that this refers to instances in the Talmud where G-d is happily ‘defeated’ by the scholarly debates of the Sages.

Sometimes G-d is depicted as laughing and dancing with the rabbis, studying and teaching Torah in the study hall, and “spending His free time playing with mythic sea-monsters”. G-d is described as a sage who wears Talit and Tefillin.

There are also dozens of Midrashic references to G-d’s clothing and crown. G-d is depicted as riding on a horse and kissing the walls of the Temple as well as some of “His most beloved human followers”.

G-d is also depicted as suffering alongside the suffering Jews.

These examples portray G-d in a far more corporeal manner than the Torah itself.

MEDIAEVAL RESPONSES TO THE TALMUDIC MODEL OF G-D:

These corporeal depictions of G-d posed some serious questions for some of the more rationalist schools of rabbinic thought which followed during the post-Talmudic and Gaonic period and which eventually culminated with the Rambam in the late 1100s.

The rationalist schools felt the need to ‘neutralize’ the Talmudic and Midrashic literature which dealt with corporeality:

“[T]hese apologetic manoeuvres included decanonizing or devaluing the non-legal sections of the Talmud and Midrash...seeing these strange divine images as ‘poetic conceits’ for the uneducated masses.”

THE ‘MAIMONIDEAN STRANGLEHOLD’:

Then Weiss, citing Yair Lorberbaum makes the point that it was Rambam who:

...created a virtual stranglehold on Jewish theology – even for later academic scholars.
From Maimonides onward, rabbinic texts concerning God were typically read through mediaeval philosophical lens...

To buttress their view, these scholars typically argued that the rabbis used the phrase ‘as it were’ [keveyachol][8] as a method to signal their lack of seriousness or literalness in what was being said...

In short rabbinic theology was not read on its own terms. ”[9]

EXAMPLES OF CONTEMPORARY ‘APOLOGIST’ LITERATURE:

This apologetic trend of the rationalists continued for centuries where explanations were given for some of the “most daring” corporeal descriptions of G-d in the Talmud as simply being expressions of “the consciousness of the presence of G-d”.[10]

The Midrashic idea that after the destruction of the Temple, G-d suffers with His people, is now described allegorically as an “intimate bond between God and his people”.[11]

And Louis Ginsberg, writing in 1901 states rather categorically that:

“Sa’adia [tenth century] is in full harmony with Rabbinical Judaism when he maintains that the corporeality of God is contrary both to reason and Scripture”.

Weiss refers to these examples as being a result of a:

“...Maimonidean hijacking of classic rabbinic thought...which...imposes abstract mediaeval categories and conceptions retroactively onto rabbinic material.”

BREAKING ‘THE MAIMONIDEAN STRANGLEHOLD - THE EVOLUTION OF REVISIONIST SCHOLARSHIP:

THE 1940s:

Weiss goes on to explain that one of the first scholars to break with this ‘Maimonidean stranglehold’ was  Arthur Marmorstein (d. 1946) who made a distinction between the two Talmudic schools of R. Akiva and R. Yishmael. R. Akiva takes the Torah more literally and “affirms a corporeal God” – while R. Yishmael adopts a non-literal approach on these matters and “rejects divine corporeality”.

By pointing out that there were two very different Talmudic schools within the early rabbinic era, Marmorstein shows that the matter of corporeality was actually debated at that time, and that the school of R. Akiva did indeed maintain the notion of divine corporeality (having authored the Shiur Komah - a work which claimed to give precise measurements of the Divine Being). [18]

THE 1960s:

Later, in 1962, Abraham Joshua Heschel took this a step further when he suggested we reject the Maimonidean tendency to rationalize away the strong corporealism of the Talmudic sages, and stop downplaying and minimizing the rabbinic anthropomorphic tradition.

As Weis emphasizes:

“For him [Heschel][12], when the Akivan school describes God as suffering with His people, for example, it means just that.”

THE 1980s:

Then in 1988, Moshe Idel[13] took this rejection of Maimonidean philosophy even one step further. Idel disputed his teacher, Gershom Scholem’s premise that Kabbalah was an alien and non-Jewish transplantation of other mystical traditions based on Gnosticism and Neo-Platonism. 

Instead, Idel argued that its origins were indeed intrinsically Jewish and very Talmudic. Kabbalistic theurgy, claimed Idel:

 “...already occupied a central place in [Talmudic][14] rabbinic thought.”

This being the case:

“Idel reads anthropormorphic [and corporeal][15] rabbinic texts literally, thereby refusing to adopt a metaphoric reading as Scholem had done.”

THE 1990s:

And finally - in the 1990s - Michael Fishbane did not mince his words after he examined, sans Maimonidean filters, dozens of early rabbinic statements about G-d and declared that according to Midrashic texts, G-d was conceived of as sometimes being a ‘vulnerable’ and ‘limited’ being!

And not only were the Jewish people in need of redemption, but so was G-d who also experienced destruction and was also in Exile![16]

In accordance with this view, Fishbane explained that the expression ‘keveyachol’ or ‘as it were’ (which often followed these expressions of corporeality) was not used to imply an allegorical interpretation as it did in the Maimonidean sense - but rather to show that the Talmudic view of G-d was so literally radical, that they could not even find accurate sources for it within the Torah text itself!

As Weiss puts it, the use of the expression of ‘keveyachol’:

“...signalled the rabbinic self-awareness that their theological claims had a tenuous link to Scripture.”

Interestingly, Weiss makes the point that Fishbane’s position was adopted by “leading rabbinics scholars of the day, such as Daniel Boyarin...Meir Bar-Illan...and Alon Goshen-Gottstein...


ANALYSIS:

This has only been a limited presentation of Professor Weiss’ research on how various historical schools have tried to understand and (re?)read the classical Talmudic and Midrashic texts dealing with G-d.

Whether one chooses to agree or disagree with the conclusions of the scholars he cites, I believe Weiss touches a nerve concerning one of the most fundamental issues of Hashkafa (Jewish worldview) that is often overlooked.

Thus, for example, were one to have been schooled in Chassidic theology, it is very likely that one would view theological[17] Talmudic literature through that filter and read Chassidic nuances into the ancient text.  On the other hand, were one to have been schooled in the Lithuanian style of study, one might view theological Talmudic literature as being an extension of the Lithuanian worldview and unconsciously interpolate that view within the text.

The Chassid may consider a Talmudic sage to be like a Rebbe - while the Lithuanian might view the same individual as a Lithuanian scholar. And to compound matters even further, a Rambamist rationalist might frame the theological Talmudic texts more allegorically than literally - while a mystical Kabbalist might read something a little closer to the plain meaning of the original theological text.

Unless we are prepared to remove the filters, it is very difficult to accept that in all probability, the same Talmudic sage may actually have been in an entirely different category altogether!

I believe this holds true not only of the way we filter the classical texts, but it also applies to how we choose (or are told) to relate to every single text and even to ideas we come across.

We are always hearing explanations that amount to:  What it says is not really what it means.

We stop listening to a text or an idea but immediately engage the ‘correct’ filters before that text or idea has a chance to express itself.

Sadly, so many ideas and concepts in Judaism get lost, suppressed, redefined and bent by filters which silence the intention of the original text.




[1] The Rabbinic God and Mediaeval Judaism, by Dov Weiss.
[2] Parenthesis mine. Weiss is referring particularly to the more modern scholars from the time of the Wissenschaft des Judentums (1819) until the late 1980s.
[3] Parenthesis mine. (Weiss refers to the difference between mediaeval philosophical and mystical schools as opposed to rational and mystical schools.)
[4] Parenthesis mine.
[5] Both these links deal with some post-Talmudic rabbinic views of a corporeal G-d. Our focus in this article is on a possible Talmudic view of a corporeal G-d.
[6] For a more thorough examination of this issue, see The Body of God in Ancient Rabbinic Judaism: Problems of Interpretation, by Jose Costa.
[7] Parenthesis mine.
[8] Parenthesis mine.
[9] I would add that this was indeed the case with regard to the religious rationalists and the (often secular) academic scholars who followed after Rambam. However, this was not always the case with the Kabbalists (and many Tosafists) who were often known to have taken Midrashic literature quite literally. And it should be pointed out that to a large extent the Kabbalistic view did, in fact, become the de facto worldview of mainstream Judaism despite the influence of the anti-mystical views of Rambam.
[10] Philosophies of Judaism: The History of Jewish Philosophy from Biblical Times to Franz Rosenzweig, by Julius Guttmann (1966) 34.
[11] Ibid. 35.
[12] Parenthesis mine.
[13] Kabbalah: New Perspectives, Moshe Idel.
[14] Parenthesis mine.
[15] Parenthesis mine.
[16] The Kotzker Rebbe is said to have made a similar statement. While the rest of the Jewish world believed in Tikkun Olam (rectifying the world), in Kotzk they had the audacity to believe in rectifying G-d (so to speak?).
[17] As opposed to Halachic.
[18] Not everyone agrees with this distinction between R. Akiva and R. Yishmael, as we saw earlier with Midrash haGadol where R. Yishmael is also described as a corporealist. Furthermore, both R. Yishmael and R. Akiva are said to have authored Shiur Komah.  
Meir Bar-Ilan shows that it is possible that the Midrash haGadol version, quoting R. Yishmael, and which has no parallel in other rabbinic sources, may have been "due to some kind of interior censorship" by scribes unhappy with some of these anthropomorphic depictions of G-d.



DIGEST OF  SOME KNOWN CORPOREALISTS:

The following is a list of some references to Magshimim (corporealists) from around the time of Rambam:


Abraham Ibn Daud reports that masses of Jews believed God to be a material being.1

Maimonides, who argues so forcefully against the corporealists, himself speaks of numerous people, including "the majority" of the ignorant, who held to anthropomorphic views. He also mentions meeting a talmudic scholar who was unsure if God had a body.2

Yedaiah Bedershi writes how it is well known that the belief in God's corporeality was spread throughout virtually all Israel in "previous generations" (i. e. before Maimonides was able to reverse matters).3

Other scholars who testify to anthropomorphic views being held by Jews include R. David Abudarham,4 the anonymous author of Ma'amar ba-Sekhel, 5 R. Isaac ben Yedaiah,6 R. Moses of Salerno,4 and R. Shem Tov ben Joseph ibn Shem Tov, the well known commentator on the Guide. 8

In addition, R. Moses Nahmanides,9 R. David Kimhi,10 R. Abraham Maimonides,11 R. Solomon ben Meshullam da Piera,12 R. Samuel Sapurto,13 R. Shem Tov Falaquera,14 R. Isaac ben Latif,15 and R. Moses Alashkar16 all speak of anthropomorphism being accepted by scholars.17

Although it was difficult for post-medieval scholars to sympathize with the anthropomorphist position, this was not the case for R. Samuel David Luzzatto.18 Although he obviously did not subscribe to this belief, he nevertheless defended it with all his vigor, for, in his opinion, it was all that the masses were able to grasp. Because of this, he maintained that it was proper for the Sages to ascribe corporeality to God. However, sensitive to the implication of what he was saying, he added that this was not a base corporeality, but a perfected corporeality. "The early ones ascribed to God and the angels and the souls a very fine spiritual essence, more subtle than any body known to us but nevertheless characterized by form and build."19 Rather than this being heresy, Luzzatto claimed that it is the doctrine of incorporeality which, through its association with philosophy, leads to heresy. He felt that it would be infinitely better if Jews were to return to the simple belief in a corporeal God.20

4. Ha-Emunah ba-Ramah (Frankfurt, 1853), 47, 91.
2. Guide I: 1; A. Lichtenberg, Kovez Teshuvot ha-Rambam ve-Iggerotav (Leipzig, 1859), II, 8a, 8c; Yizhak Shailat, Iggerot ha-Rambam (Ma'aleh Adumim, 1987), I, 320, 322 (Arabic), 341, 346 (Hebrew).
3 . Sbe'elot u-Teshuvot ha-Rashba (Lvov, 1811), "418 (p. 47b). Cf. R. Yom Tov Ishbili, Sefer ha-Zikkaron, ed. Kalman Kahana (Jerusalem, 1959), 59. See also R. Elijah Delmedigo, Behinat ha-Dat (Vienna, 1833), 25, who, entirely ignoring R. Sa'adah Gaon, gives Maimonides all the credit for discrediting the anthropomorphists.
4. Abudarham ha-Shalem, ed. S. A. Wertheimer (Jerusalem, 1957), 362.
5. (Vienna, 1816), 14a.
6. See M. Saperstein, op. cit., 185-86. R. Isaac refers to "faithless 'Sadducees' who say that God is [composed of] a matter which is finer, purer, and more transparent than the matter of any shining star."
7. See J. L. Teicher, op. cit., 84-85.
8. See his commentary to Maimonides' Introduction to the Guide (p. 10a in the standard edition.)
9 . A. Lichtenberg, op. oil., III, 9d; Kitvei Ramban, ed. Chavel (Jerusalem, 1963), I, 345.
10. Lichtenberg, ibid., III, 3c.
11. Ibid., 16ff.                         
12. See the poems published by Hayyim Brody, Yedi'ot ha-Makhon le-Heker haShirah ha-'Ivrit 4 (1938): 102: האומרים כבוד והחשבים דמות / דעות חלוקים הם ולא אל תנאף באומרים גשמות ואם /לא-ל תמונת האנוש צירו העובדים צורם ופיו לא מרו / כפרו/ כמה חכמים אמרו שעור והם Ibid., 34: .אך האמן / ואמור אמן כי יש מנהיג יושב חביון / ובסוד גשמות / אם הוא בדמות / לדעת זאת אין לך רישיון See also Ibid., 91, for another defense of the anthropomorphists and Ozar Nehmad 2 (1851): 85.
13 . See Kerem Hemed 5 (1841): 12. He is apparently the author of this letter directed to the French rabbis, in which he writes: ככם מגשימים הגויים בהבלי היש .See also Sapurto's letter published in Ginze Nistarot 4 (1818): 44ff. (Halberstamm, who edited this letter, does not believe that the letter published in Kerem Hemed was authored by Sapurto; see ibid., 37.)
14. See his letter in A. Lichtenberg, op. cit. III 23ff (lIt also is found in R. Abba Mari Astruc, Minhat Kena'ot [Pressburg, 1838L 183ff.) The letter is anonymous but there is reason to assume that Falaquera is the author; see Heinrich Graetz, Geschichte der Juden (Leipzig, 1863), VII 474. In reference to Rabad's assertion that there were people "greater and superior" to Maimonides who believed in God's corporeality, .(bגדולים ממנו בקומתם וטובי מראה ובריאי בשר (23 ויתכן שהיו :sarcastically responds Falaquera
15. See He-Haluz 7 (1865): 91-92.
16 . She'elot u-Teshuvot Maharam Alashkar (Jerusalem, 1988), #117 (p. 312). Alashkar singles out the French sages. In his words, they were guilty of מגשימים בפרהסיא , a phrase which actually appears in Bedershi's apology. Alashkar further notes that it was due to Maimonides' works that this widespread anthropomorphism was uprooted.
17. I have deliberately avoided mention of evidence that appears in non-Jewish sources. As is well known, Jewish anthropomorphism was also a common accusation of Muslim polemicists.
18 . See Monford Harris, "The Theologico-Historical Thinking of Samuel David Luzzatto," Jewish Quarterly Review 52 (1962): 317ff.
19. Peninei Sbadal (Przenlysl, 1888), 274. See also R. Judah Aryeh Modena, Magen ve-Herev, ed. Shlomo Simonsohn (Jerusalem, 1960), 40.
20. Iggerot ShadaI (Cracow, 1891), 1195-97.


[Extracted from: Maimonides' Thirteen Principles: The Last Word in Jewish Theology?  By Marc B. Shapiro.]